on, a morally good act is also right. 3. According to Prichard, an ac? on done from a sense of obliga? on, there is no purpose consis? ng either in the ac? on itself or in anything which it will produce. A mo? ve, being something that moves one to act, can be the sense of obliga? on, an ac? on done from a sense of obliga? on can indeed have a mo? ve. 4. Avirtuous act is done from a desire that is intrinsically good. A moral act may be done from obliga? on.
There cant be an obliga? on to act virtuously, because we can only feel an obliga? on to act or do something. We cannot, however, feel an obliga? on to act from a certain desire 5. It is a mistake to expect moral philosophy to prove through argumenta? on that we ought to ful+ll our obliga? ons, because moral rightness cannot be demonstrated, only apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. The sense of obliga? on is a result of a moral thought or thoughts. Moral philosophy can provide re-ec? on on the immediacy of our knowledge of moral rightness and the intui? ve recogni? on of the goodness of the virtues.