A terrorist strike by the use of a biological weapon to civilians will entail responses that primarily differ from the counter demanded by a hit that uses explosives as well as nuclear explosives or chemical weapons. The public health and medical reaction to a bioterrorist hit determination also differ considerably from reaction to ordinary disasters. Construction of efficient response programs entail that these distinctions be evidently recognized. The result of a bioterrorist strike on inhabitant would turn out to an epidemic (Brachman H, et al. 1960). A bioterrorist attack on civilian may possibly have several results, ranging from low-grade signs confined to a local region and not instantly recognized as an effect of biological weapons employ, to an extensive epidemic. The first responders would be nurses, public health professionals, and physicians in local health departments. A covert bioterrorist strike could probable come to notice increasingly, as doctors turn out to be conscious of an accumulation of mysterious deaths among healthy citizens. The accuracy and speed with which laboratories and physicians reached right identify and reported their result to public health authorities would openly change the number of deaths, and if the attack use a infectious disease the capacity to embrace the epidemic.
The major areas concerned in reacting to a bioterrorist occurrence include planning, detection, diagnosis, investigation, treatment, communications, and training (Brachman ,at el 1998). In the planning stage, attention must be set to close cooperation among the multiple links that have tasks for implementing the procedures. The partners at local levels, and the federal, state must assist in developing the tactics and also in carrying out the tasks. The main purpose must be to carry on the quantization of the occurrence to a minimum. Administrators must offer management proficiency that creates the environment in which at hand can be successful achievement of the objectives (Friedland A, et al. 1993). Additional professions include communication and public relations specialists, laboratories personnel, epidemiologists, surveillance personnel, heath care personnel, environmentalists, behavior scientists, and support personnel. Resources, such as sufficient and responsive laboratory supplies and facilities; access to computers; and other kinds of transportation, communication, and finances must be obtainable.
In response plan of detection public health surveillance which can be either passive or active but must be sensitive and specific. The basic, regular, passive public health inspection system in place throughout is the first stage of detection system. It resolve necessary to develop case description for the reporting of syndrome of concern in the bioterrorist reaction system. The area of bioterrorism reaction is that of diagnosis (Meselson et al. 1994). It is obvious from the recent anthrax bioterrorism occurrence that health care expert must be educated concerning diseases to which they not have been exposed in their education given that rarity or nonexistence of the diseases.
Investigations should be started at the local level with fast and ready support from federal and state agencies. There requirements of clarification from the start about who has the accountability for conducting and directing the investigations, as a bioterrorist event will bring into the investigative ground more than simply the public health agency. There requirements of a rapid evaluation of the most favored method of treatment via the most reasonable and up-to-date knowledge to stop death, control the increase of disease, and stop additional cases. Suggestion should be efficient as new information is available. There must be agreement about the items in the stockpile and clear procedures about how necessities can be made for release of the items.
Communication is the main feature of the bioterrorism response preparation not only for prevention and control function but to temper the hysteria and fear that results from bioterroristic measures. One cannot eliminate hysteria and fear, but education and communication can help change it and reduce its effect on the people. Public relations personnel are supposed to be given the accountability for release and preparation of this information, designed for a well-informed and single source. The final, aspect of the bioterroristic response is training; all categories of concerned personnel must be skilled concerning their own tasks. This can be achieved through educational programs, Internet material, and written materials (Schaffner and LaForce 1996). Tabletop training, that is, field trials of the reaction plan, can be extremely effective not simply in educating the responders but in recognizing the deficiencies in the procedures.
In conclusion, if a bioterrorist attack takes place, the resulting response will employ all levels most of federal agencies, several professional communities and government, mostly public health professionals and health care provider. Bioterrorist attack takes place in an environment of, uncertainty, fear and great tension. Resolution will have to be coordinated and made very fast. Implementation and planning of effective response tactics must take into consideration the complexity of this challenge and the inter-institutional nature, essential multidisciplinary of the crisis.
Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF. Anthrax. In: Evans AS, Brachman PS, eds. (1998).Bacterial infections of humans. New York, NY: Plenum Medical Book Co,:95107.
Brachman PS, Plotkin SA, Bumford FH, et al. (1960). An epidemic of inhalation anthrax: the first in the twentieth century. II. Epidemiology. Am J Hyg 1960;72:623.
Brachman, PS, Gold H, Plotkin SA, et al. (1962). Field evaluation of a human anthrax vaccine. Am J Public Health;52:63245.
Friedland AM, Welkos SL, Pitt ML, et al. (1993). Postexposure prophylaxis against experimental inhalation anthrax. J Infect Dis;54:2836.
Glassman HN (1958); World incidence of anthrax in man. Public Health Rep;73:224.
Meselson M, Guillemin J, Highes-Jones M, et al. (1994). The Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979. Science; 266:12028.
Schaffner W, LaForce FM. (1996). Training field epidemiologists: Alexander D. Langmuir and the Epidemic Intelligence Service. Am J Epidemiol 144:S1622.